Marchés obligataires et crises bancaires dans les pays émergents
This paper deals with the question of knowing if countries with bank based financial activity face crises more expensive than those where bond markets are broader and more developed. Based on the work of Arteta (2005), the results of the empirical tests on a panel of emerging countries suggest that bank based financial systems are associated with slightly more expensive crises, whereas the relation between bond markets and the costs of crises is fragile. Besides, market based financial systems with a stronger confidence in bond markets are associated with a higher growth of production independently of the presence or not of crises. The originality which we carry to Arteta’s work consists in considering the joint effect of financial liberalization and institutional environment on the development of bond markets. Our results show the importance of the order of financial liberalization. We join in this direction one of the most significant aspects of the “sequencing” theorized by McKinnon (1973). Moreover, effective prudential regulation tends to reduce significantly the probability of occurrence of banking crises. An effective internal and external regulation is necessary to contain the increase in the risk inherent to the expansion of the new activities dictated by the aforementioned liberalization, to which financial managers and analysts of various institutions are often badly prepared.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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