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Deterring Exploitation: Social Norms and Punishment Technology

Author

Listed:
  • Michalis Drouvelis
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Yuta Shimodaira

Abstract

When are actors deterred from exploiting those over whom they hold unilateral power? We study this question in a laboratory experiment using a 2×2 design that extends the power-to-take game, varying whether the proposer can give as well as take, and whether the responder can destroy the proposer’s endowment at no cost (costless retaliation). Either variation alone leaves proposer behaviour unchanged, even though costless retaliation substantially increases punishment. Only when giving is feasible and retaliation is costless do proposers take significantly less, with average take rates falling from 60% to below 40%. Our findings show how institutional structures—through available action sets and punishment technologies—jointly determine whether exploitation is deterred.

Suggested Citation

  • Michalis Drouvelis & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yuta Shimodaira, 2024. "Deterring Exploitation: Social Norms and Punishment Technology," ISER Discussion Paper 1262rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Jun 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1262rr
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1262RR.pdf
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