Partial Welfare Judgements as Preliminaries for Rational Social Choice
The new welfare economics, both of the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky-Samuelson school built on the compensation principles and the Bergson-Samuelson school built on the social welfare function, tried to expand the domain of applicability of the Pareto unanimity principle. The purpose of this paper is to examine the logical structure of the new welfare economics of the both schools from the view point of social choice and fairness theory.
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