IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dpr/wpaper/0429.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Adverse Selection in Clubs and the Demand for Nondiscriminatory Equal Access Policies vs. Quotas

Author

Listed:
  • Mumy, G-E

Abstract

Because of very concrete knowledge of race and sex discrimination, a particularly important class of peer group effects arise when agents of one type want to associate with agents of another type, while agents of that other type prefer association among themselves. Competitive provision in the presence of this king of peer group effect is the focus of this paper. Charges of unfair pricing and access limitation have often been met by governmental policies banning price discrimination between types and exclusionary restrictions. The purpose of this paper is to analyze explicitly the characteristics of competitive equilibria that might emerge under these kinds of policy controls, and the extent to which these equilibria can generate demands for inclusionary quotas.

Suggested Citation

  • Mumy, G-E, 1996. "Adverse Selection in Clubs and the Demand for Nondiscriminatory Equal Access Policies vs. Quotas," ISER Discussion Paper 0429, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0429
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MINORITY GROUPS ; PRICING ; GOVERNMENT POLICY;

    JEL classification:

    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0429. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/isosujp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.