The Entry Incentives of Complementary Producers: A Simple Model with Implications for Antitrust Policy
We model competition between two firms in a vertical upstream-downstream relationship. Each firm can pay a sunk cost to enter the other’s market. For equilibria in which both firms enter, the downstream price can be lower than the joint profit maximizing level, and coordination (e.g., through merger) is anticompetitive.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Justice Antitrust Division 450 Fifth Street NW Washington, DC 20530|
Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
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