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Distributive Justice and Bargaining Solutions

Listed author(s):
  • Nejat Anbarci


  • Ching-jen Sun


Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950).s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By adding a relative equity component to SSP, we first consider a stronger version of it, the Strong Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSSP) property. It turns out that the Egalitarian solution is the unique solution satisfying SSSP. We then consider two weaker versions of SSP, namely WSSP and alpha~WSSP. Yet, it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution by using WSSP and SI only. alpha~WSSP is much weaker than Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) when alpha= 1. It turns out that it is possible to characterize the Nash solution by using Individual Rationality (IR), SI and alpha~WSSP for any alpha between [0 1).

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Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number 2009_20.

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Date of creation: 08 Dec 2009
Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2009_20
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