IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Corporate Governance and the Uncertain Role of Interlocking Directorates:Director Networks in Germany and their Impact on Financial Performance

  • Enrico Prinz

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Registered author(s):

    This article deals with interlocking directorates and the increasing attention this topic has been attracting in recent years. Financial theory tends to regard the subject of directorship interlocks generally negative, even if theoretical argumentation also allows speaking favoura-bly of the effects personnel relations have in a firm's perspective. At this point of time, em-pirical findings are contradictory and do not allow making concluding remarks on the impact director ties have on corporate performance. In order to fill this gap, we analyse interlocks between the 30 largest listed German companies from 2001 to 2005 for testing their impact on corporate performance. Our findings indicate that board appointments of executives harm firm performance. However, those interlocks seem to lower managing director compensation of the appointing firm. Interlocks between supervisory board members do not have any influ-ence, neither on financial performance, nor on management payment levels.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://leg.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/wp/1061001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1061001.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1061001
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

    Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
    Email:


    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1061001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angèle RENAUD)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.