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Politique d'endettement et réseau d'appartenance des dirigeants;capital structure and managers' influential networks

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Michel Chapuis

    () (Université de La Rochelle)

  • Mathieu Paquerot

    () (Université de La Rochelle)

Abstract

(VF)Cet article expose comment la politique d'endettement constitue un avantage concurrentiel pour une stratégie d'enracinement des dirigeants. En étudiant l'activité du réseau des anciens de l'École Nationale d'Administration (Ena), il apparaît que leur présence à la fois dans les organes de direction des grandes entreprises françaises et dans les milieux financiers, conduit à s'interroger sur le rôle de la relation d'endettement dans le système de gouvernement d'entreprise français. Les tests réalisés sur les données financières de 1995 soulignent un endettement significativement plus élevé des entreprises dirigées par des énarques comparativement à des polytechniciens ou autres.(VA) This paper explains how much debt a firm issues do advantage for an entrenchment strategy. By the way, Ena's ex-students seems to manage French firms and to trust French banks. This questions the nature of the debt contract in French corporate governance. 1995 empirical tests show that firms managed by énarques have more debt than polytechniciens or others managers do.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Chapuis & Mathieu Paquerot, 2003. "Politique d'endettement et réseau d'appartenance des dirigeants;capital structure and managers' influential networks," Working Papers CREGO 1030401, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1030401
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    Keywords

    endettement; réseau; Ena; gouvernement d'entreprise; debt policy; influential network; Ena; corporate governance;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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