Financial Innovation and Competition among Intermediaries
We analyze the competition among financial intermediaries in a model with product differentiation. The cases of one-sided competition, where banks compete in bid-ask spreads, and two-sided competition, where they compete for deposits and for loans separately, are compared. We show that under two-sided competition equilibrium profits and bid-ask spreads are lower and banks choose a smaller amount of differentiation, i.e., competition is fiercer in this case.
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