Eductive stable transmission of information though prices: A brief review of results
The paper provides a brief review of existing results on the transmission of information through prices, when the revealing equilibria have to fit a criterion of "eductive stability". The work under review often suggests that, at odds with the "efficient market hypothesis", the plausibility of equilibria, according to the criterion, decreases when equilibria transmit too much information.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Assessing Rational Expectations: "eductive" stability in economics, MIT Press|
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