On stability and incentives in hierarchies
Situations where a group of individuals takes collective decisions are subject to instabilities when subgroups may form. In this paper, we analyze how a hierarchical organization avoids such instabilities, while distributing some power among the subordinates and the subgroups they may form. Incentives to reveal private information are also studied.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris|
Phone: 01 43 13 63 00
Fax: 01 43 13 63 10
Web page: http://www.delta.ens.fr/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2001-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.