IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/1350.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Optimal Fair Job Assignment Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Zaifu Yang

    (Yokahoma National University)

Abstract

We study the problem of how to allocate a set of indivisible objects like jobs or houses and an amount of money among a group of people as fairly and as efficiently as possible. A particular constraint for such an allocation is that every person should be assigned with the same number of objects in his or her bundle. The preferences of people depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they take. We propose a solution to this problem, called a perfectly fair allocation. It is shown that every perfectly fair allocation is efficient and envy-free, income-fair and furthermore gives every person a maximal satisfaction. Then we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a perfectly fair allocation. It is shown that there exists a perfectly fair allocation if and only if an associated linear program problem has a solution. As a result, we also provide a finite method of computing a perfectly fair allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Zaifu Yang, 2002. "An Optimal Fair Job Assignment Problem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1350, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1350
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d13/d1350.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perfectly fair allocation; equity; efficiency; indivisibility; multi-person decision; discrete optimization;

    JEL classification:

    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matthew Regan). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.