Balancing the Scales: Halakha, the Firm, and Information Asymmetries
Sellers are typically better about product quality and sales practices than are purchasers, and might be tempted to exploit their superior knowledge to deceive buyers. Firms themselves, buyers, and third-parties attempt to level the playing field with a variety of confidence-building measures, including reputational signals, purchaser monitoring, and government regulations. This pragmatic approach has its echoes in Halakha --Jewish law-- which, too, was concerned about information asymmetries and which introduced countervailing measures.
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