Micro Shocks and Aggregate Risks
The paper presents a "micro" shock explanation of aggregate risk. Shocks are independent over agents, and equilibria are always unique. It is shown that any amount of aggregate risk can be generated by games in which shocks to players are independent. Explicit examples are given, some of which elaborate on examples in the literature. Implications are drawn for factor-analytic methods of extracting aggregate shocks.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||1986|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:86-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.