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Reputation and Patience in the “War of Attrition”

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  • Kornhauser, Lewis A.
  • Rubinstein, Ariel
  • Wilson, Charles

Abstract

This article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. The authors extend the description of a game to include a specific "irrational" (mixed) strategy for each player. Depending on the irrational strategies chosen, the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately. A player is weaker if he is more impatient or if his irrational strategy is to wait in any period with the higher probability. Copyright 1989 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Kornhauser, Lewis A. & Rubinstein, Ariel & Wilson, Charles, 1986. "Reputation and Patience in the “War of Attrition”," Working Papers 86-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:86-06
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    File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9397/RR86-06.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Hattori, Keisuke, 2016. "Profit-maximizing Wages under Duopoly," MPRA Paper 70288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
    3. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March.
    4. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
    5. Peter Burton, 2004. "Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 135-163, February.
    6. Asako Yasushi, 2015. "One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 313-331, July.
    7. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. Peter S. Burton, 2008. "Bargaining by Limiting Cooperation: Withholding Consent for the Level of a Public Good," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 623-642, August.
    9. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.

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