Reputation and Patience in the “War of Attrition”
This article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. The authors extend the description of a game to include a specific "irrational" (mixed) strategy for each player. Depending on the irrational strategies chosen, the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately. A player is weaker if he is more impatient or if his irrational strategy is to wait in any period with the higher probability. Copyright 1989 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||1986|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:86-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.