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Which Social Choice Rule is More Dictatorial?

Author

Listed:
  • Bednay, Dezső
  • Fleiner, Balázs
  • Tasnádi, Attila

Abstract

Social choice rules (SCRs) aggregate individual preferences to social preferences. By Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem there does not exist a non-dictatorial SCR satisfying three desirable properties. Considering this negative axiomatic result, in this paper we determine distances of SCRs from the dictatorial rules to rank common SCRs. In particular, we apply the Kendall tau, the Spearman rank correlation and the Spearman footrule metrics. We find that from the investigated SCRs the Borda, the Copeland and the Kemény-Young SCRs stand out. Furthermore, we show that anonymous SCRs approach the constant rule when the number of alternatives is fixed and the number of voters tends to infinity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bednay, Dezső & Fleiner, Balázs & Tasnádi, Attila, 2023. "Which Social Choice Rule is More Dictatorial?," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2023/03, Corvinus University of Budapest.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2023/03
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    File URL: https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/8100/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simulation; Asymptotic behavior; Dictatorship; Kendall tau; Spearman rank correlation; Spearman footrule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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