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Régulation multidimensionnelle d’un monopole polluant et majorité politique aléatoire

Author

Listed:
  • Hélène BOISSON

    (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

Le contrat de régulation optimale d'un monopole avec deux paramètres d'information privée et d'antisélection (productivité et niveau d'émissions polluantes) est caractérisé. Dans ce contexte de screening bidimensionnel, un aspect d'économie politique est introduit en considérant l'objectif du régulateur comme le résultat d'un processus électoral majoritaire. En fonction du régime politique, deux types de contrats apparaissent : l'un est séparateur, l'autre mélangeant. Leur occurrence dépend de la confrontation des incitations sociales et privées qui résultent de l'arbitrage effectué par le régulateur entre l'extraction de la rente informationnelle et le gain d'efficacité allocative.

Suggested Citation

  • Hélène BOISSON, 2005. "Régulation multidimensionnelle d’un monopole polluant et majorité politique aléatoire," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005032, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2005032
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2005032.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Régulation de monopole; Screening multidimensionnel; Economie politique;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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