On the Generic Occurrence of Price Regulations
There exists an extensive literature on economies with price rigidities, where some constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. In this paper a model of a political economic system is described where the price rigidities are endogenously chosen by political candidates. The economic system is modelled by a general equilibrium model and the political system as a game between political candidates who maximize political supports. Conditions for the existence of a political economic equilibrium and characterizations of this equilibrium are given. Moreover, it is shown that, generically, political candidates will not choose price regulations leading to a Walrasian equilibrium, but instead will impose price regulations upon the economic system which exclude all Walrasian equilibria and therefore lead to rationing of consumers.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +32 10473945
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1996008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.