Non-Cooperative Exercise Boundaries and Regulation under Uncertainty: The Case of Cost-Reducing R&D
This paper extends the concept of the exercise boundary as an analytical tool in determining when an optimizing agent might undertake an irreversible action under uncertainty. to situations where the objective function of optimizing agents depends on decisions taken by other agents. By using the case of cost redusing R&D in a fixed numbers oligopoly under demand and technological uncertainty, the exercise bounadaries and the corresponding optimal R&D accumulation paths are determined fot the non-cooperative, cooperative, and socially optimal cases. Comparison of the exercise boundaries makes possible the formulation of R&D policy in the form of subsidies.
|Date of creation:||16 Sep 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +30 831 77405
Fax: +30 831 77406
Web page: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kostis Pigounakis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.