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Samaritan Bundles: Clustering in NGO Projects

Author

Listed:
  • Gani ALDASHEV

    (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

  • Marco MARINI

    (University La Sapienza, Roma, Italia)

  • Thierry VERDIER

    (PSE and Ecole des Ponts Paris-Tech, Paris, France)

Abstract

We build a model with non-governmental organizations competing through fundraising for donations and choosing issues to focus their projects on. Donors have latent willingness-to-give that differs across issues, but need to be "awakened" to give. Raising funds focusing on the same issue creates positive spillovers across NGOs. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the same market (clustering) with spillovers, or to face weaker competition under issue specialization. The resulting equilibrium configuration crucially depends on the donors’ baseline willingness-to-give and the cost of fundraising. We also develop variants of the model with donors’ asymmetric (issue-dependent) willingness-to-give, settings where NGOs can coordinate their fundraising activities and/or issue choices, the inter-temporal choices of NGOs, and illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gani ALDASHEV & Marco MARINI & Thierry VERDIER, 2018. "Samaritan Bundles: Clustering in NGO Projects," CIRIEC Working Papers 1806, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    • Handle: RePEc:crc:wpaper:1806
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    File URL: https://www.ciriec.uliege.be/repec/WP18-06.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-governmental organizations; Fundraising; Foreign Aid; Clustering;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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