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Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium

Author

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  • Coles, Melvyn G
  • Muthoo, Abhinay

Abstract

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 and 1987) by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as job centres and newspapers in the labour market, or real estate agents in the housing market, which puts potential traders into direct contact with each other. With agent heterogeneity, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade coexist, namely strategic bilateral bargaining and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov Perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.

Suggested Citation

  • Coles, Melvyn G & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1994. "Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:938
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    Cited by:

    1. de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "Too Much Investment : A Problem Of Coordination Failure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 703, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Igal Hendel & Aviv Nevo & François Ortalo-Magné, 2009. "The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1878-1898, December.
    3. Eric Smith, 2010. "High and Low Activity Spells in Housing and Labor Markets," 2010 Meeting Papers 943, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. William Hawkins, 2013. "Worker Flows under Mismatch," 2013 Meeting Papers 479, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Jos van Ommeren & Giovanni Russo, 2014. "Firm Recruitment Behaviour: Sequential or Non-sequential Search?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 76(3), pages 432-455, June.
    6. Jos van Ommeren & Giovanni Russo, 2004. "Sequential or Non-sequential Recruitment?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-109/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 15 Sep 2008.
    7. Coles, Melvyn G & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2002. "A Test Between Unemployment Theories Using Matching Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 3241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Eric Smith, 2015. "High and Low Activity Spells in Housing Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 5601, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. William Hawkins & Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, 2016. "A Stock-Flow Theory of Unemployment with Endogenous Match Formation," 2016 Meeting Papers 1542, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Lisi, Gaetano, 2010. "Introduzione allo studio dei modelli di "matching" del mercato del lavoro
      [Introduction to the study of matching models of unemployment]
      ," MPRA Paper 22735, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Ebrahimy, Ehsan & Shimer, Robert, 2010. "Stock-flow matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1325-1353, July.
    12. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Discussion Papers 1384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 842-863, August.
    14. Eric Smith & Carlos Carrillo Tudela, 2007. "Wage Dispersion and Wage Dynamics Within and Across Firms," 2007 Meeting Papers 615, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Ewa Gałecka-Burdziak, 2012. "Labour market matching – the case of Poland," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 43(3), pages 31-46.
    16. repec:esx:essedp:775 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Robert Shimer, 2007. "Mismatch," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1074-1101, September.
    18. Lisi, Gaetano, 2011. "Matching Models of Equilibrium Unemployment: An Overview," MPRA Paper 30191, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Li, Chunding & Whalley, John, 2014. "China's potential future growth and gains from trade policy bargaining: Some numerical simulation results," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 65-78.
    20. Harashima, Taiji, 2011. "A Mechanism of Cyclical Volatility in the Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio: What Is the Source of Rigidity?," MPRA Paper 32476, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Lisi, Gaetano, 2013. "The Benchmark Macroeconomic Models of the Labour Market," MPRA Paper 62318, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Gregg, Paul & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2005. "Stock-flow matching and the performance of the labor market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1987-2011, November.
    23. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Perfect Equilibrium; Strategic Bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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