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Distributional Conflicts, Power and Multiple Growth Paths

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  • Saint-Paul, Gilles
  • Verdier, Thierry

Abstract

This paper shows that multiple growth paths may occur in a politico-economic model of endogenous growth. This multiplicity is characterized by the coexistence of a low-tax, low-capital-flight equilibrium and a high-tax, high-capital-flight equilibrium. The likelihood of multiplicity is crucially related to the structure of power in society. For multiplicity to arise, it is necessary that the group in power (or the group that is decisive in determining the political outcome) has greater access to international capital markets than the average in the economy. The model provides an example of an inefficient allocation resulting from majority voting among rational agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Saint-Paul, Gilles & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "Distributional Conflicts, Power and Multiple Growth Paths," CEPR Discussion Papers 633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. François Bourguignon, 1990. "Growth and Inequality in the Dual Model of Development: The Role of Demand Factors," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 215-228.
    2. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dorn91-1, January.
    3. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
    4. Anand, Sudhir & Kanbur, S M R, 1985. "Poverty under the Kuznets Process," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 42-50, Supplemen.
    5. Becker, Gary S & Tomes, Nigel, 1979. "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1153-1189, December.
    6. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism," NBER Chapters,in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 7-13 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
    2. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1996. "Are consumption taxes really better than income taxes?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 475-503, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital Flight; Distributional Conflict; Endogenous Growth; Political Equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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