Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values
We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2003|
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