International Monetary Stability Between the Wars: Structural Flaws or Misguided Policies?
This paper examines the international monetary system between the Wars. It confirms the generality of several widely held interpretations of recent experience with floating exchange rates. There is a positive association between nominal exchange rate flexibility and nominal exchange rate variability, and between nominal and real exchange rate variability. But policies which reduce nominal exchange rate variability do not guarantee a proportionate reduction in nominal exchange rate risk or in real exchange rate variability and unpredictability without a credible commitment to a stable intervention rule.The paper then considers four potential explanations for the collapse of the fixed rate regime of 1926-3l: failure to play by the `rules of the game'; inadequate international economic leadership by the United States; inadequate cooperation among the leading Gold Standard countries; and structural features of a system in which reserves comprised both gold and foreign exchange. It concludes by assessing the role of the international monetary system in the Great Depression.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nouriel Roubini, 1988. "Offset and Sterilization Under Fixed Exchange Rates With An Optimizing Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 2777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1988.
"Real exchange rate behavior under alternative international monetary regimes : Interwar evidence,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 363-371, March.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1987. "Real Exchange Rate Behavior Under Alternative International Monetary Regimes: Interwar Evidence," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0nh766xh, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1987. "Real Exchange Rate Behavior under Alternative International Monetary Regimes: Interwar Evidence," Economics Working Papers 8755, University of California at Berkeley.
- Baxter, M. & Stockman, A.C., 1988.
"Business Cycles And The Exchange Rate System: Some International Evidence,"
RCER Working Papers
140, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Marianne Baxter & Alan C. Stockman, 1988. "Business Cycles and the Exchange Rate System: Some International Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1987.
"Did International Economic Forces Cause the Great Depression?,"
Economics Working Papers
8751, University of California at Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen, 1988. "Did International Economic Forces Cause The Great Depression?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(2), pages 90-114, 04.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1987. "Did International Economic Forces Cause the Great Depression?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt27p2v5zm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Jeffrey Sachs & Charles Wyplosz, 1984. "Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 1255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Artis, M. J., 1987. "The European monetary system: An evaluation," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 175-198.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985.
"Can exchange rate predictability be achieved without monetary convergence? : Evidence from the EMS,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 93-115.
- Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1984. "Can exchange rate predictability be achieved without monetary convergence? : evidence from the EMS," International Finance Discussion Papers 245, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.