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Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?

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  • Svensson, Jakob

Abstract

This Paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features: not all firms report they need to pay bribes; and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. To explain these patterns we construct a simple bargaining model. The model yields predictions on both the incidence and the level of graft. Consistent with the model we find that variation in policies/regulations (across industries) explain the incidence of corruption, while variation in profitability and technology choice explain the variation in bribes for the group of bribe paying firms. These findings suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are endogenously determined in order to extract bribes.

Suggested Citation

  • Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3167, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3167
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. World Bank, 2008. "Mauritania : Anti-Corruption Study," World Bank Publications - Reports 12731, The World Bank Group.
    2. Claire Giordano, Paloma Lopez-Garcia, 2018. "Is corruption efficiency-enhancing? A case study of the Central and Eastern European region," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 15(1), pages 119-164, June.
    3. Sandra Blagojevic & Jože P.Damijan, 2012. "Impact of Private Incidence of Corruption and Firm Ownership on Performance of Firms in Central and Eastern Europe," LICOS Discussion Papers 31012, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    4. Indranil Dutta & Ajit Mishra, 2003. "Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 152, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    5. Ishengoma, Esther K. & Kappel, Robert, 2008. "Business Constraints and Growth Potential of Micro and Small Manufacturing Enterprises in Uganda," GIGA Working Papers 78, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    6. Emma Galli & Danilo V. Mascia & Stefania P. S. Rossi, 2017. "Small Firms, Corruption, and Demand for Credit. Evidence from the Euro Area," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(11), pages 158-174, November.
    7. Thuy Dieu Nguyen, 2020. "Does firm growth increase corruption? Evidence from an instrumental variable approach," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 237-256, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Quantiative data;

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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