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Deciding Before You Are Persuaded

Author

Listed:
  • Dewan, Torun
  • Eliaz, Kfir

Abstract

We study how a decision maker can use a committed deadline to discipline a biased sender's information acquisition. Evidence arrives through public tests, and both investigation and waiting are costless. With sufficient time, the sender induces favourable decisions by eliminating unfavourable possibilities. A shorter deadline can instead make direct evidence the sender's only route to persuasion. We characterize the optimal deadline and show when it achieves perfect accuracy. For general discovery technologies, the gain compares undiscovered guilt with wrongly convicted innocence. Under continuous posterior paths and feasible stopping, no deadline improves accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Dewan, Torun & Eliaz, Kfir, 2026. "Deciding Before You Are Persuaded," CEPR Discussion Papers 22113, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:22113
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP22113
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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