IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/22044.html

Competitive Centrality: Equilibrium and Comparative Statics in Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Li, Jian
  • Zenou, Yves
  • Zhou, Junjie

Abstract

We study equilibrium behavior and the propagation of local shocks in networked competition. We introduce competitive centrality, a nonlinear centrality measure that is uniquely determined by network primitives and provides a sufficient statistic for equilibrium behavior. It determines players’ effort allocations and winning probabilities in each bilateral competition. We then use competitive centrality to derive exact expressions for equilibrium responses to local shocks and characterize their signs. Local shocks propagate along network paths according to players’ relative competitive positions. Although these responses can be non-monotone, a simple sign rule determines whether a shock raises or lowers competitive centrality and effort along a propagation path. Together, these results show how network structure and relative competitive positions shape equilibrium responses to local shocks. Interventions that appear to reduce competition—including removing players or links and imposing effort caps—can therefore have unintended consequences elsewhere in the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Jian & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2026. "Competitive Centrality: Equilibrium and Comparative Statics in Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 22044, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:22044
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP22044
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:22044. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CEPR (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://cepr.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.