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Downton Revisited: Income Shocks and Aristocratic Marriage Markets, 1840–1913

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  • Taylor, Mark

Abstract

We develop a transferable-utility threshold model in which the collapse of arable estate income reshaped the aristocratic marriage market. The model predicts two cash-for-prestige substitution channels: a durable senior shift toward American brides, especially liquid new-money fortunes, and a transitory middle- and lower-rank shift toward British commercial commoners. Using a genealogical database of 6,018 dated marriage records over 1840–1913, we construct male-groom samples and combine trend-adjusted bride-share evidence with within-year variation in peerage rank and individual variation in estate scale. American and British-commercial shares rise as real wheat prices fall, whereas matches with the cash-poor genteel professions move with arable income, the reversed sign the model requires. British-commercial matches are concentrated below the peerage apex, and their aggregate expansion is transitory. With full marriage-year effects, the within-year American-marriage gradient across ranks steepens sharply as wheat prices fall, a result no common annual trend can generate. Individual-level estate regressions confirm a sizeable American wheat-price response but find no detectable amplification with estate scale within rank. New-money brides rise from 20% to 60% of classified American matches and constitute 62.5% of senior-rank matches against 34.4% at junior ranks. The results show how a large external income shock repriced inherited status against liquid wealth within an otherwise highly exclusive marriage market.

Suggested Citation

  • Taylor, Mark, 2026. "Downton Revisited: Income Shocks and Aristocratic Marriage Markets, 1840–1913," CEPR Discussion Papers 21884, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21884
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • Q11 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis; Prices
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation

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