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Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure

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  • Gersbach, Hans

Abstract

How should collective decision-making with proposal-making and voting be organized in the absence of a centralized mechanism designer? We introduce Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure in which agents choose between exercising proposal power and retaining voting rights. Under one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, PoV implements the Condorcet winner in a single voting round. For an odd number of agents, the implementing equilibrium is globally unique: exactly the median agent chooses to propose. For an even number of agents, multiplicity may arise, but uniqueness can be restored through a simple tie-breaking device. The results show how efficient agenda formation can emerge from decentralized incentives without preference revelation or centralized enforcement. The framework extends naturally to candidate elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans, 2026. "Propose or Vote: A Canonical Democratic Procedure," CEPR Discussion Papers 21026, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21026
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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