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Political Information and Network Effects

Author

Listed:
  • Egorov, Georgy
  • Guriev, Sergei
  • Mironov, Maxim
  • Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina

Abstract

Why do political campaigns so often yield unexpected results? We address this question by separately estimating the direct effect of a campaign on targeted voters and the indirect effect on others in the same social environment. Partnering with a local NGO during Argentina’s 2023 presidential election, we randomized the distribution of leaflets providing an expert assessment of the consequences of the potentially dangerous proposals by the outsider candidate Javier Milei. Exploiting Argentina’s unique sub-precinct election reporting system, we show that the campaign reduced Milei’s support among directly treated voters, as expected, but increased his support among untreated voters in treated precincts, producing a backfiring, net-positive effect for Milei. A pre-registered replication confirmed these opposite-signed effects. Using theory and a survey experiment, we show that the minority of voters who disbelieved the campaign were more motivated to discuss it with peers, convincing them to support Milei. This mobilization effect appears especially likely when campaigns criticize outsider candidates. Our results highlight how campaigns aimed at anti-elite candidates can unintentionally mobilize support for them.

Suggested Citation

  • Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Mironov, Maxim & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2025. "Political Information and Network Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 20781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20781
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    JEL classification:

    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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