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Can Democracy Cope with Extreme Views?

Author

Listed:
  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Schneider, Maik T.
  • Tejada, Oriol

Abstract

We study how democracies can manage extremist minority views through Coalition-Preclusion Promises (CPPs), where parties credibly commit to excluding extremists from governing coalitions. We identify conditions under which CPPs improve social welfare by preventing extreme policy shifts. However, these benefits depend on parties’ incentives and voters’ ability to coordinate. The resulting voting game features multiple equilibria, and we extend typical equilibrium selection criteria. Our findings suggest CPPs can be an effective strategy to keep extremist parties out of government.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T. & Tejada, Oriol, 2025. "Can Democracy Cope with Extreme Views?," CEPR Discussion Papers 20435, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20435
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP20435
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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