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The Optimality of Majority Rule: An Information-Choice Perspective

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  • Bobkova, Nina

Abstract

This paper shows how the voting rule impacts which characteristics of an alternative voters learn about. Before casting their vote, voters face a trade-off between learning about an objective quality of the alternative or about their idiosyncratic match. I show that the further the quota is from majority rule, the less voters learn about the objective quality of the alternative and the more dispersed are their beliefs about it. Among all quotas, the majority rule uniquely (i) aligns votes and beliefs, (ii) maximizes voters’ ex-ante utility, and (iii) aggregates full information for large elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Bobkova, Nina, 2024. "The Optimality of Majority Rule: An Information-Choice Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 19777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19777
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP19777
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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