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A Political Disconnect? Evidence From Voting on Trade Agreements

Author

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  • Conconi, Paola
  • Cucu, Florin
  • Gallina, Federico
  • Nardotto, Mattia

Abstract

We study votes of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the approval of free trade agreements (FTAs). Against widespread Eurosceptic arguments, we find that MEPs are responsive to the interests of their electorate and their re-election chances increase with the extent to which their votes on trade agreements are aligned with their constituents’ interests. By contrast, US legislators’ votes on FTAs are disconnected from their electorate’s interests and do not impact their re-election chances. Our results suggest that legislators’ accountability on a policy issue may depend on its salience relative to other policies in the legislators’ sphere of competence.

Suggested Citation

  • Conconi, Paola & Cucu, Florin & Gallina, Federico & Nardotto, Mattia, 2024. "A Political Disconnect? Evidence From Voting on Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 19609, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19609
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP19609
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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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