Venture Capital: A Case for Investment Promotion
Venture capitalists provide risk capital and valuable monitoring services that are essential for the success of upstart companies. The financial sector’s expertise in monitoring investment proposals may increase with the accumulated experience in funding such projects. In the other direction, the productivity gains from learning lower the cost of venture capital finance and reinforce start-up investment. Since learning depends on aggregate investment, the effect is external to individual agents. The paper demonstrates how the nature of the externality depends on the state of financial sector development, and how the appropriate tax/subsidy policy should be tailored to it.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1887. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.