IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/18691.html

Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Tarantino, Emanuele
  • Terstiege, Stefan
  • Vigier, Adrien

Abstract

We study the sale of consumer data allowing firms to engage in discriminatory pricing. When an independent data intermediary sells information, the consumer surplus is as if all firms were fully informed. We then consider the case where the data intermediary also competes in the final goods market. We show that the integrated data intermediary may choose not to sell full information to its rivals; this strategic behavior lowers consumer surplus. We study the industry’s equilibrium structure and show that acquiring a firm by an independent data intermediary always reduces consumer surplus. We apply the insights of our analysis to the debate on self-preferencing in the digital advertising industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarantino, Emanuele & Terstiege, Stefan & Vigier, Adrien, 2023. "Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 18691, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18691
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP18691
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18691. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CEPR (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://cepr.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.