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An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy

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  • Besley, Tim
  • Brzezinski, Adam

Abstract

This paper introduces deliberation into an economic model of policy making. A government decides whether to implement a policy which requires citizen compliance. The citizens' and government's objectives diverge since only the latter internalizes externalities. Hence, the government cannot credibly inform the citizens about policy effectiveness. However, it can introduce a deliberative process in which citizens can influence each other. We contrast deliberation driven by informative exchange with that affected by motivated reasoning and show that either type can improve welfare, even when beliefs polarize. Making the outcomes of deliberation binding can reduce welfare by disincentivizing the government from holding deliberations and from implementing policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Tim & Brzezinski, Adam, 2023. "An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 18618, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18618
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP18618
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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