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The Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism: Theory and Evidence

Author

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  • Bellodi, Luca
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Nicolò, Antonio
  • Roberti, Paolo

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of populism centered on commitment politics – a type of agency relationship in which political candidates promise specific and monitorable policies. The shift to commitment politics is driven by increased distrust toward government institutions, which is itself a consequence of the cognitive complexity and disinformation typical of modern social media environments. In equilibrium, candidates who adopt a commitment platform rationally choose all the complementary strategies associated with populism, including anti-elite rhetoric, misinformation, aversion to judicial independence, and bureaucratic expertise. The paper presents observational and experimental evidence from the United States on the supply (candidates’ rhetoric) and demand of commitment (voters’ preferences) consistent with the model’s key predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bellodi, Luca & Morelli, Massimo & Nicolò, Antonio & Roberti, Paolo, 2023. "The Shift to Commitment Politics and Populism: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 18338, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18338
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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