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How to Regulate Carbon Emissions with Climate-conscious Consumers

Author

Listed:
  • Schmidt, Klaus
  • Herweg, Fabian

Abstract

Carbon prices are the most powerful instrument to reduce CO2 emissions, but there is strong political opposition to raising them to the efficient level. Therefore, additional efforts of consumers, firms, and local governments to reduce emissions are required. We study how regulatory regimes affect moral behavior and show that a carbon tax complements voluntary efforts to reduce emissions, while cap-and-trade discourages them. In the model consumers can invest in offsets which increases welfare and buy and delete emission rights which leads to more emissions. Furthermore, cap-and-trade shifts the burden of adjustment to poor consumers and has dysfunctional incentive effects. These results are robust to uncertainty and imperfect competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian, 2022. "How to Regulate Carbon Emissions with Climate-conscious Consumers," CEPR Discussion Papers 16985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16985
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Carbon pricing; Carbon tax; Cap-and-trade; Climate change; Behavioral industrial organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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