Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance
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- Köke, Jens, 2000. "Control transfers in corporate Germany: their frequency, causes and consequences," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-67, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-977.
- Jens KÃ¶ke, 2002. "Dynamics in ownership and ﬁrm survival: Evidence from corporate Germany," MEA discussion paper series 02013, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
- Florian Heiss & Jens Köke, 2004.
"Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany,"
European Financial Management,
European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(1), pages 167-195.
- Heiss, Florian & Köke, Jens, 2001. "Dynamics in ownership and firm survival: evidence from corporate Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-63, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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KeywordsBanks; Block Trades; Corporate Governance; Germany; Takeovers;
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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