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Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth

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  • Ponzetto, Giacomo
  • Glaeser, Edward

Abstract

Psychologists have long documented that we over-attribute people's actions to innate characteristics, rather than to luck or circumstances. Similarly, economists have found that both politicians and businessmen are rewarded for luck. In this paper, we introduce this "Fundamental Attribution Error" into two benchmark political economy models. In both models, voter irrationality can improve politicians' behavior, because voters attribute good behavior to fixed attributes that merit reelection. This upside of irrationality is countered by suboptimal leader selection, including electing leaders who emphasize objectives that are beyond their control. The error has particularly adverse consequences for institutional choice, where it generates too little demand for a free press, too much demand for dictatorship, and responding to endemic corruption by electing new supposedly honest leaders, instead of investing in institutional reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Ponzetto, Giacomo & Glaeser, Edward, 2017. "Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth," CEPR Discussion Papers 12206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12206
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    Cited by:

    1. Jongmin Shon, 2022. "Does Competition Tame the Leviathan? A Case of Earmarked Spending for Transportation," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 241(2), pages 59-78, June.
    2. Jongmin Shon, 2022. "Tax Competition over Tax Base: An Evidence of Local Sales Tax in California Counties," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 241(2), pages 59-77, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fundamental attribution error; Political economy;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics

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