Counterfeit Product Trade
We analyze a two-country model of trade in both legitimate and counterfeit products. Domestic firms own trademarks and establish reputations for delivering high-quality products in a steady-state equilibrium. Foreign suppliers export legitimate low-quality merchandise and counterfeits of domestic brand-name goods. Heterogeneous home consumers either purchase low-quality imports or buy brand-name products, rationally expecting some degree of counterfeiting of the latter. We characterize a counterfeiting equilibrium and explore its properties. We describe the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting in comparison with a no-counterfeiting benchmark. Finally, we provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are confiscated at the border.
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|Date of creation:||Apr 1986|
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- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
- Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
- Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
- Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
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