Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information
This paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz , and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.
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