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Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information


  • Fagart, Marie-Cécile


This paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Fagart, Marie-Cécile, 1993. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9317, CEPREMAP.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9317

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Thomas Mariotti, 2016. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," 2016 Meeting Papers 820, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.

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