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Aspects stratégiques des négociations internationales sur les pollutions transfrontières et du partage des coûts de l'épuration

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  • CHANDER, Parkash
  • TULKENS, Henry

Abstract

[fre] Aspects stratégiques des négociations internationales sur les pollutions transfrontières et du partage des coûts de l'épuration. . Cette communication présente un processus de négociations internationales portant sur des pollutions transfrontières, formulé en termes d'une succession temporelle de décisions résultant d'analyses coûts-avantages accompagnées de transferts internationaux, et conduisant à un optimum de Pareto unanimement préféré au laissez-faire. Cette formulation, inspirée de la théorie des procédures d'allocation des ressources, fait apparaître sous la forme de ce que l'on appelle ici un « surplus écologique » les gains que permet la coopération.. Au-delà de cette propriété, qui est connue, on fait ici, en termes de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, une double analyse : d'une part, au moyen de jeux dits « locaux », celle de la question de savoir comment répartir le surplus, et par là les coûts de l'épuration, entre les pays concernés ; d'autre part, celle des raisons pour lesquelles il est plausible que cette même clé conduise le système économico-écologique à un élément du noyau du jeu « global » que l'on peut y associer. [eng] Strategic aspects of international negotiations on transfrontier pollution and of abatement cost sharing. . In this paper, a mathematical model is formulated of negociations between countries, bearing on some form of transfrontier pollution. The model, which is designed so as to converge to a Pareto optimum unanimously preferred to laissez-faire, makes explicit an " ecological surplus " that summarizes the benefits from cooperation among the countries. In addition, cooperative game-theoretic analysis is called upon to deal with two issues : first, by means of " local " games, the issue of devising a sharing rule for the surplus, and thereby for the costs of abatement ; second, the issue of whether the optimum reached by the process could also belong to the core of the " global " game associate
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Suggested Citation

  • CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1992. "Aspects stratégiques des négociations internationales sur les pollutions transfrontières et du partage des coûts de l'épuration," LIDAM Reprints CORE 992, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:992
    Note: In : Revue Economique, 43(4), 755-768, 1992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henry Tulkens, 2006. "An Economic Model of International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 107-121, Springer.
    2. Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Dynamic Processes for Public Goods: An Institution-Oriented Survey," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 9-48, Springer.
    3. John Roberts, 1979. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 283-292.
    4. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., 1991. "Strategically Stable Cost Sharing in an Economic- Ecological Negotiation Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1991035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Chander, P., 1987. "Cost-sharing local games in dynamic processes for public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1987027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Kaitala, Veijo & Pohjola, Matti, 1992. "Acid Rain and International Environmental Aid: A Case Study of Transboundary Air Pollution Between Finland, Russia and Estonia," Discussion Papers 400, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    7. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 123-134, Springer.
    8. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Exchange Processes, the Core and Competitive Allocations," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 64-79, Springer.
    9. Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
    10. Tulkens, Henry & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1975. "Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the `polluters pay' principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 245-269, August.
    11. Chander, Parkash & Parikh, Ashok, 1990. "Theory and Practice of Decentralized Planning Procedures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 19-58.
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    1. Germain, Marc & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart, 1997. "Stabilité stratégique et pollution-stock transnationale : le cas linéaire," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1997001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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