Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90033-1
Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 48(2), 369-385, 1989
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Other versions of this item:
- Einy, Ezra & Neyman, Abraham, 1989. "Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 369-385, August.
- EINY, Ezra & NEYMAN, Abraham, 1988. "Large symmetric games and characterized by completeness of the desirability relation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Citations
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Cited by:
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2019.
"Coalitional desirability and the equal division value,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(1), pages 95-106, February.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal, 2017. "Coalitional desirability and the equal division value," Working Papers 2017-08, CRESE.
- Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2019. "Coalitional desirability and the equal division value," Post-Print halshs-01951010, HAL.
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