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Incomplétude stratégique dans les jeux de marchés compétitifs

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  • GIRAUD, Gaël

Abstract

[fre] Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games. . We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GEI model. [eng] Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games. . We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GEI model.
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  • GIRAUD, Gaël, 1998. "Incomplétude stratégique dans les jeux de marchés compétitifs," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1396, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1396
    DOI: 10.2307/3502730
    Note: In : Revue économique, 50(3), Développements récents de l'analyse économique. XLVIIème congrès annuel de l'Association française de science économique 1998, 583-592, 1999
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