Nested potentials and robust equilibria
This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for complete information games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2010|
|Date of revision:|
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