On the nature of price competition under universal service obligations: a note
The imposition of universal coverage and uniform pricing constraints, as part of the universal service obligations, makes the universal service provider less aggressive in the price game when it competes with a rm that does not cover the whole set of markets (Valletti et al., 2002). In this paper, we fully characterize the resulting price equilibrium when universal service obligations are imposed. With a limited market coverage by the entrant or a small degree of degree of product di erentiation, the equilibrium is a mixed strategy one.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||01 May 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/coreEmail:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.