IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods

  • BOCHET, Olivier
  • KLAUS, Bettina
  • WALZL, Markus

We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2005). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept. We show that each core allocation always constitutes a singleton recurrent class and provide examples of non-singleton recurrent classes consisting of blocking-cycles of individually rational allocations. For multiple-type housing markets stochastic stability never serves as a selection device among recurrent classes.Next, we propose a method to compute the limit invariant distribution of the dynamic recontracting process. The limit invariant distribution exploits the interplay of coalitional stability and accessibility that determines a probability distribution over final allocations. We provide various examples to demonstrate how the limit invariant distribution discriminates among stochastically stable allocations: surprisingly, some core allocations are less likely to be final allocations of the dynamic process than cycles composed of non-core allocations.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2007_61.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2007061.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007061
Contact details of provider: Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bochet Olivier & Klaus Bettina & Walzl Markus, 2007. "Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
  3. Neuefeind, Wilhelm, 1974. "A stochastic bargaining process for n-person games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 175-191, August.
  4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  5. Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
  6. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  7. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
  9. Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January.
  10. Agastya, Murali, 2004. "Stochastic stability in a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 203-222, August.
  11. Feldman, Allan M, 1974. "Recontracting Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 35-44, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007061. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.