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Axiomatizing the Harsanyi value, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent Shapley value

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  • DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy

Abstract

The validity of Hart (1985)'s axiomatization of the Harsanyi value is shown to depend on the regularity conditions that are imposed on the games. Following this observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric egalitarian solution (cf. Kalai and Samet (1985)) and one of the consistent Shapley value (cf. Maschler and Owen (1992)). The three axiomatic results are studied, evaluated and compared in details.

Suggested Citation

  • DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2002. "Axiomatizing the Harsanyi value, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent Shapley value," CORE Discussion Papers 2002010, Universit√© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002010
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    File URL: https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/immaq/core/dp-2002.html
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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