A welfarist version of Harsanyiâ€™s aggregation theorem
Harsanyiâ€™s Aggregation Theorem has often been dismissed as being irrelevant to utilitarianism, and thus void of ethical content. Some of these objections can be met by reformulating Harsanyiâ€™s theorem in the multi-profile context of Social Welfare Functionals theory. The present paper aims at showing that appropriately formulated single-profile variants of the theorem also meet the objections, and thus arguably make sense in terms of utilitarianism. More precisely, using an â€œenlargedâ€ single-profile approach, we derive a Harsanyi-like representation which is both anonymous and compatible with meaningful comparisons of cardinal utility functions. These results depend on reformulating Harsanyiâ€™s aggregation theorem in the social-choice theoretic framework of welfarism.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 1997|
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